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Abstract: This paper offers an empirical test of the effect of the mortgage 
interest deduction (MID) on both the extensive (own vs. rent) and intensive 
(size of home) housing purchase margins. Using state level differences in MID 
availability to identify, I examine this relationship using standard ordinary 
least squares, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, and sample 
selection estimation techniques. I find the MID to be responsible for a 10.9–
18.4% increase in the size of home purchased, but that no relationship exists 
between the MID and home ownership. These results imply an elasticity of 
home size with respect to changes in user cost between −1 and −1.4. 
 
1. Introduction 
The mortgage interest deduction (MID,) will reduce income tax 
revenues by more than $98 billion in fiscal year 2012 (Executive Office 
of The President, 2011). A major criticism of this tax expenditure, and 
of the MID as a policy in general, is that it encourages excessive 
purchase of housing.1 Using parameterized theoretical models, Mills, 
1987 and Poterba, 1992 suggest the tax favored2 status of housing 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
2 
 
causes a 12–24% increase in housing consumption (or over-
investment relative to other assets in the context of the user cost 
model).3 Although these theoretical models are parameterized using 
real values for important determinants of the housing purchase choice, 
they do not offer direct evidence that the MID effects housing 
purchase decisions. Existing empirical work offers little precise 
evidence that directly links the MID to the amount of housing 
purchase.4 
This paper offers an empirical test of how the MID effects 
housing purchase on both the extensive (own vs. rent) and intensive 
(size of home) margins. I use state-level differences in the availability 
of the MID to identify how the MID effects housing purchase 
decisions.5 Using state level policy as a basis, I compare housing 
purchase decisions for residents of states with an MID to several 
control groups where the MID is not available at the state level. I also 
employ several estimation techniques to identify the effect of the MID 
on housing purchase decisions – ordinary least squares, instrumental 
variables, and regression discontinuity. 
Using dwelling level data from the American Housing Survey 
(AHS) on owner occupied homes, estimates show that the MID is 
responsible for a 10.9–18.4% increase in the size of home purchased 
(statistically significant in nearly all cases), depending on the 
econometric specification and comparison group. This result is robust 
to instrumental variables estimation, using states that take the federal 
definition of itemized deductions as an instrument for a state level 
MID. Estimates show a smaller, but still meaningful relationship 
between home size and the MID using regression discontinuity 
estimation with census tract level data. Estimates show no statistically 
significant relationship between the MID and the probability a home is 
owner occupied in most cases, although in some cases I find a 
negative relationship. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the theoretical relationship between the MID, 
homeownership, and size of home purchase. Section 3 describes how 
this work fits into the previous literature. Section 4 outlines the 
identification strategy for estimating the relationship between the MID 
and housing purchase. Section 5 discusses the data for estimation. 
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Section 6 reports results using my primary identification strategy and 
alternative identification strategies. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theoretical considerations for the relationship 
between the MID and housing 
The standard model used to study the tax treatment of owner 
occupied housing is the user cost model. See Rosen, 1979a, Rosen, 
1979b, Rosen, 1985, Poterba, 1984, Poterba, 1992, Green and 
Vandell, 1999, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003 and Himmelberg et al., 2005 
and Anderson et al. (2007) for variations of this model. The user cost 
model is useful for understanding how the presence of a MID and 
changing marginal tax rates effect both the purchase price and annual 
cost of home ownership. The user cost model, however, offers limited 
insight on the margin where the MID begins to subsidize housing 
purchase, and the joint effects of reduced income and changing 
relative price caused by income tax rate changes. 
To examine how the MID effects housing purchase decisions, 
consider its impact on a consumer budget constraint, depicted in Fig. 
1. Fig. 1 shows a budget constraint for a consumer considering the 
trade-off between owner occupied housing and all other goods. The 
dotted line shows the budget constraint without the MID, and the solid 
line shows how the MID changes the budget constraint. A budget 
constraint with the MID differs from the standard budget constraint in 
two important ways – it creates a “kink” point, and it makes 
consuming additional housing cheaper beyond this point. 
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Fig. 1. Consumer budget constraint with mortgage interest deduction.  
The kink point exists because the MID is not available until a 
home owner itemizes deductions on their tax return. A home owner 
will not itemize deductions until the sum of those deductions is greater 
than the standard deduction. Therefore, the MID does not begin to 
change the relative price of owner occupied housing until the amount 
of mortgage interest exceeds the difference between the standard 
deduction and all other itemized deductions. In equation form, the MID 
begins to subsidize the purchase of owner occupied housing when: 
𝑖𝜃𝑃𝐻 = 𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 − ∑ 𝐼𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 
(1) 
where i is the interest rate on a mortgage, θ is the share of the home 
purchase financed with debt, and PH is the full purchase price of the 
home. SDeduct represents the amount of standard deduction allowed 
without itemizing, and IOtherDeduct are amounts of all other deductions 
allowed for itemizers. 
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After the point where a consumer purchases enough owner occupied 
housing so that the mortgage interest covers the difference between 
all other itemized deductions and the standard deduction, the MID 
lowers the relative price of additional housing, flattening the budget 
constraint. For this segment of the budget constraint, the income and 
substitution effects work together – encouraging consumers to 
purchase more owner occupied housing. Fig. 1 shows why the MID 
does not necessarily subsidize owner occupied housing on the 
extensive margin (moving from renting to owning), but subsidizes 
owner occupied housing on the intensive margin (purchasing a larger 
home). This is one explanation why previous evidence suggests no 
relationship between federal itemization rates and home ownership 
rates (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003). 
While Fig. 1 shows how implementing a MID effects the 
consumer’s budget constraint, it does not consider the effect of an 
income tax directly (a necessary condition for the presence of the 
MID). Fig. 2 shows how increasing the marginal income tax rate and 
allowing an MID affect the consumer’s budget constraint. The presence 
of an income tax with an MID changes the budget constraint in two 
ways – shifting it in closer to the origin at all points and flattening it 
out for all points where the amount of mortgage interest exceeds the 
difference between the standard deduction and all other itemized 
deductions. 
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Fig. 2. Consumer budget constraint with higher marginal tax rate and 
mortgage interest deduction.  
Fig. 2 shows why it is inappropriate to use only individual 
variation in the income tax rate to assess the effect of the MID on 
housing market outcomes, and why it is necessary to control for the 
marginal tax rate when assessing the effect of the MID. The first order 
effect of higher marginal tax rates is to shift the budget constraint 
toward the origin – causing a reduction in consumption of housing and 
all other goods. The second order effect of the higher marginal tax rate 
is to flatten the portion of the budget constraint for housing 
consumption greater than the kink point – where both the income and 
substitution effects say to consume more housing (relative to the case 
with no MID). Fig. 2 shows that comparing consumers with different 
marginal tax rates to identify the effect of the MID can be misleading 
because of the confounding effects of the income reduction, and 
suggests that estimates of the effect of the MID should control for the 
negative income effect of higher marginal tax rates when examining 
the effect of the MID. 
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3. Previous studies of the relationship between 
the MID and housing 
There have been a number of previous studies attempting to 
determine the link between home ownership and the MID. Rosen and 
Rosen (1980) estimate a model using time series variation to predict 
that the national home ownership rate would be 4% points lower 
without a MID. Hendershott and Schilling (1982) provide slightly 
higher estimates in the range of 5–6.5%, depending on the assumed 
average marginal income tax rate. Linneman (1985) uses proxies for 
marginal tax rates to show that tax treatment of housing is an 
important determinant of homeownership in a cross section of cities.6 
More recently, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) estimate the relationship 
between the average subsidy created by the MID and home ownership 
rates using quarterly national time series data and a cross section of 
state level data. They find an extremely small positive relationship 
between the subsidy created by the MID and homeownership rates in 
some specifications, but on balance their results show no relationship 
between home ownership and the MID. 
There is a smaller literature that links the MID to demand for 
mortgage debt. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
Follain and Dunsky (1997) show that the demand for mortgage debt is 
highly responsive to changes in the income tax rate that applies to the 
MID. They find that the elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to an 
income tax rate change is between −1.5 and −3.5 depending on the 
year of data used in estimation. Using data from the American Housing 
Survey, Ling and McGill (1998) show the rate of tax savings on 
mortgage interest is a significant determinant of the amount of 
mortgage debt. They find that owners with a lower average rate of tax 
savings (measured by the amount of housing related deductions that 
potentially go unused) from the MID have significantly lower demand 
for mortgage debt. 
In addition to studies that directly estimate the effect of the MID 
on home ownership decisions and the demand for mortgage debt, 
there is a literature that examines the interaction between both real 
and proposed policy and the value of the MID. Rosen (1979a) 
estimates a model to show without the MID, residents would live in 
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homes that are less valuable. Follain and Ling (1991) show that the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the MID essentially worthless for many 
households with low incomes. Poterba (1992) also analyzed the 
distribution of the MID before and after TRA86, finding a similar result. 
Green and Vandell (1999) examine a hypothetical revenue-neutral 
switch from the current MID and property tax deduction to a housing 
tax credit. Anderson and Roy (2001) examine the impact for taxpayers 
across the income distribution of removing both the mortgage interest 
and property tax deductions. Anderson et al. (2007) examine the 
differential effect of proposals to impose limits on federal mortgage 
interest deductibility across metropolitan areas. Bourassa and Yin 
(2007) also examine MID limits and show they would have an 
especially negative impact on ownership decisions for young residents 
of urban areas. 
This paper makes four contributions to the previous literature. 
First, in addition to estimating the relationship between the MID and 
homeownership, I estimate the relationship between the MID and the 
amount of housing consumed (measured in square feet). Second, I 
improve upon the data used to estimate the effect of the MID on 
homeownership by using dwelling-level micro data. Third, I use cross 
section variation created by differences in state-level MID policy and 
control for the top marginal tax rate to eliminate the income effects of 
higher marginal tax rates. Lastly, I use both instrumental variables 
and regression discontinuity to estimate this relationship. 
4. Identification strategy 
The federal MID is available to all income taxpayers who itemize 
deductions, however, not all states have an income tax and not all 
states that have an income tax allow an MID. I use the cross section 
variation in MID availability for state income tax purposes to identify 
how it effects both the homeownership decision and the size of home 
purchased.7 First, I use policy variation across all states to estimate 
the effect of the MID on home size and ownership. Estimates of this 
relationship compare homes in states with the MID against a variety of 
comparison groups; all other states, all other income tax states, and 
all states with a top marginal income tax above the median. Then, I 
estimate the effect of the MID on home size and ownership using the 
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policy difference on either side of a state border where one state 
allows the MID and the other does not in a regression discontinuity 
framework. 
The use of state-level policy variation as opposed to the actual 
choice to claim the MID is advantageous for two reasons. The first is 
that a data source containing both actual tax information and detailed 
home purchase decisions does not exist. The second is an econometric 
issue. An individual’s decision to claim the MID is likely to be a 
function of several other factors: level of education, income, the 
presence of dependents (i.e. children), and availability of other 
deductions. Many of these factors are also likely to be directly linked to 
housing purchase decisions, immediately raising endogeneity 
concerns. State level availability of the MID is arguably exogenous at 
the individual level, or is at least not highly correlated with other 
individual characteristics that drive housing purchase decisions. 8 
4.1. Comparison of state-level policies 
To identify the effect of the MID on home size and ownership I 
estimate the following regression: 
𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(MID)𝑖 + 𝛽2(Top MTR)𝑖 + 𝛧𝑖
ˊ𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 
where Y is either the size of the home measured in square feet, or an 
indicator variable equal to one if the home is owner occupied and 
equal to zero otherwise. MID is a variable equal to one if the home is 
in a state that allows the mortgage interest deduction and zero if it 
does not. Top MTR is the top marginal state income tax rate. The 
income tax burden is an important control because the MID is a 
feature of states that have an income tax, and the first order effect of 
an income tax is lower income, which lowers demand for housing.9 
Without controlling for the income tax rate, Eq. (2) would likely be 
biased toward underestimating the effect of the MID on housing 
market outcomes.10Z is a set of control variables that includes the age 
in years and age-squared of the housing unit, a dummy variable 
indicating if it is a single family residence, the annual maintenance 
costs per square foot, price per square foot, age (in years) of the 
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household head, age of household head squared, a variable indicating 
if the household head is non-white, annual household income, an 
indicator if the house is located in the central city of a metropolitan 
area, the mortgage interest rate, and census region dummy variables. 
I also estimate Eq. (2) using controls for the year the current owner 
moved into the home in some specifications. 
When the dependent variable in Eq. (2) is square footage of the 
home, the coefficient of interest (β1) is interpreted as the marginal 
effect of an MID on the size of home purchased. When the dependent 
variable in Eq. (2) is an indicator of the home being owner occupied, 
the coefficient of interest (β1) is interpreted as how the MID changes 
the probability of home ownership. Because of concerns with 
correlation between Z and the MID variable, I estimate Eq. (2) with 
and without control variables to eliminate concerns that bad control 
variable bias drives my results. The results section discusses concerns 
with comparison group viability and endogeneity in estimating (2). 
4.2. Regression discontinuity 
The abrupt change in mortgage interest deductibility that 
happens at a state border makes a regression discontinuity method 
attractive to identify the effect of the subsidy on outcomes of interest. 
If the mortgage interest deduction affects housing market outcomes, 
then we would expect to see a sharp change in outcomes on either 
side of a border between two states with differing MID policy. Using 
the border between Pennsylvania and Maryland, known as the Mason–
Dixon Line (MDL), is ideal for regression discontinuity for several 
reasons. 
First, this border is not the result of geological features like a 
river or mountains that could impede building a home.11 Second, the 
border is between two states with similar income tax rates going back 
for several years. Similar income tax rates are necessary to avoid 
picking up income effects from the difference in tax rates. Lastly, 
Pennsylvania has never allowed a MID going back to when the income 
tax was implemented in 1971,12 and Maryland has allowed a MID at 
going back as far as when the state income tax began being collected 
in 1939.13 
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In practice, regression discontinuity requires regressions of the 
following form: 
𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽1(Distance to MDL)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , where: 0
< Distance to MDL < ℎ 
(3) 
And 
𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑀𝐷 + 𝛽1(Distance to MDL)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , where: 0
< Distance to MDL < ℎ 
(4) 
where H is a particular outcome of interest (tenure choice or home 
size) and h is the bandwidth in miles around the MDL used in the 
regression. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I test the 
difference between estimated coefficients (αMD − αPA) = 0, as a 
measure of the effect of the MID policy change on housing market 
outcomes. 
The logic behind the regression discontinuity is to estimate the 
intercept term at the MDL approaching it from both the north and the 
south. The difference in intercepts estimate, (αMD − αPA), allows me to 
see if there is a sharp change in housing market outcomes at the point 
where the MID policy change happens. I also estimate the regression 
discontinuity equations without controlling for distance to the MDL, 
these results essentially compare the unconditional mean home size 
within a specified bandwidth around the MDL. 
5. Data on home size and homeownership 
I estimate Eq. (2) using dwelling level data from the 2007 
American Housing Survey (AHS). I use the 2007 AHS National survey, 
rather than the newer 2009 survey, because it includes dwellings 
sampled from the six largest metropolitan areas. For the size of home 
regressions, only homes that are owner occupied are used because 
renters will not benefit from the MID directly. The ownership 
regressions use all homes in the AHS survey. 
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The unit of observation in the AHS is the dwelling. The AHS data 
consists of householder responses to survey questions on the actual 
dwelling and the composition of the occupants of the dwelling. The 
homes surveyed in the AHS include a core sample of homes that has 
not changed since 1985 and newly constructed dwellings added to the 
core annually by sampling addresses from building permits data. The 
data contain a wealth of information about the dwelling, including if it 
is owner-occupied, and its size measured in square feet- used as 
dependent variables in Eq. (2). 
The constraint on using the AHS data to estimate Eq. (2) is 
knowledge of MID availability across states and time. To identify 
whether a state has an MID available in a given year I examine state 
tax forms.14 I am able to match state MID policy information for all 
states from 2003 to 2007 (the final year of new homes in the AHS), 
Table 1 summarizes the state tax information. I use dwellings where 
the current resident moved in during the 2003–2007 period, and 
match data on MID availability according to the year of move and state 
location. 
Table 1. State tax summary. 
 Income tax MID available Use federal itemized 
Alabama Yes Yes Yes 
Alaska No No No 
Arizona Yes Yes Yes 
Arkansas Yes Yes No 
California Yes Yes Yes 
Colorado Yes Yes Yes 
Connecticut Yes No No 
Delaware Yes Yes Yes 
District of Columbia Yes Yes Yes 
Florida No No No 
Georgia Yes Yes Yes 
Hawaii Yes Yes No 
Idaho Yes Yes Yes 
Illinois Yes No No 
Indiana Yes No No 
Iowa Yes Yes No 
Kansas Yes Yes No 
Kentucky Yes Yes No 
Louisiana Yes No –a 
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 Income tax MID available Use federal itemized 
Maine Yes Yes Yes 
Maryland Yes Yes Yes 
Massachusetts Yes No No 
Michigan Yes No No 
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes 
Mississippi Yes Yes Yes 
Missouri Yes Yes Yes 
Montana Yes Yes No 
Nebraska Yes Yes Yes 
Nevada No No No 
New Hampshireb No No No 
New Jersey Yes No No 
New Mexico Yes Yes Yes 
New York Yes Yes Yes 
North Carolina Yes Yes Yes 
North Dakota Yes Yes Yes 
Ohio Yes No No 
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes 
Oregon Yes Yes Yes 
Pennsylvania Yes No No 
Rhode island Yes Yes Yes 
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes 
South Dakota No No No 
Tennesseeb No No No 
Texas No No No 
Utah Yes Yes Yes 
Vermont Yes Yes Yes 
Virginia Yes Yes Yes 
Washington No No No 
West Virginia Yes No No 
Wisconsin Yes Yes –c 
Wyoming No No No 
aBeginning in 2007, Louisiana allowed taxpayers to deduct 57.5% of federal 
itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction. 
bNew Hampshire and Tennessee do not tax wages, only interest and dividends; 
they are considered to have 0 mtr for this reason. 
cWisconsin gives tax payers a credit based on the value of federal itemized 
deductions.  
The National AHS sample identifies the location of a home at the 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) level. I match the SMSA 
to a state to identify MID availability and marginal tax rates; however, 
some SMSAs span multiple states. I exclude most multi-state MSAs, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
14 
 
except New York and Chicago, which the AHS codes to allow 
identification of sub-MSA areas (for example New York is separated 
into Northern New Jersey and New York plus some of the Long Island 
counties). I exclude the following SMSAs from my analysis because I 
cannot directly allocate MID and tax rate information to them: 
Augusta, GA-SC, Chattanooga, TN-GA, Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, 
Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-IL, Duluth, MN-WI, Johnson City-
Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA, Kansas City, KS-MO, Lawrence-Haverhill, 
MA-NH, Memphis, TN-AR, MS, Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA-NC, Omaha, 
NE-IA, Philadelphia, PA-NJ, Saint Louis, MO-IL, Washington, DC-MD-
VA (included in the regression discontinuity estimates as state is 
identifiable in census data).15 
The SMSA identifier in the AHS is also restricted to only identify 
homes in an SMSA with a population greater than 100,000, excluding 
all homes in smaller SMSAs and homes not in SMSAs. The Appendix 
Table shows the counts of homes in my data by SMSA for both the size 
and ownership regressions. Using a sample of relatively large SMSAs 
and excluding rural areas may be problematic for estimating the effect 
of the MID if the excluded homes in MID states are more (less) likely 
to be owner occupied or be larger (smaller). This is classic sample 
selection based on the exogenous explanatory variable, highlighted in 
Wooldridge (2002), and I perform robustness checks accounting for 
this problem accordingly. Data constraints leave a sample of 2,315 
observations where the home is owner-occupied to estimate the size of 
home regressions, and 6,531 observations of owners and renters to 
estimate the probability of ownership regressions. Column 1 of Table 2 
summarizes the control variables used in estimating (2) for the units in 
the sample. 
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Table 2. Comparison of observable differences between states with MID and 
comparison areas. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All owner 
occupied 
homes 
States 
with 
MID 
States 
without 
MID 
States 
without 
MID, With 
Income 
Tax 
States 
with MID, 
with 
income 
tax over 
median 
States 
without 
mid, with 
income 
tax over 
median 
(2)–
(3) 
(2)–
(4) 
(5)–
(6) 
Top State MTR 5.49 (3.66) 7.94 
(1.79) 
3.18 
(3.65) 
5.82 
(3.00) 
9.28 
(0.68) 
10.16 
(1.48) 
4.76 
[0.00] 
2.12 
[0.00] 
−0.88 
[0.00] 
Age of housing 
unit (years) 
40.77 
(24.69) 
41.07 
(24.67) 
40.49 
(24.80) 
45.03 
(26.62) 
40.24 
(23.69) 
53.44 
(27.61) 
0.58 
[0.57] 
−3.96 
[0.00] 
−13.2 
[0.00] 
Single family 
home 
0.74 (.44) 0.73 
(0.44) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.68 (0.47) −0.02 
[0.30] 
−0.01 
[0.51] 
0.03 
[0.50] 
Annual 
maintenance 
costs per sq. 
ft. 
0.57 (1.13) 0.62 
(1.35) 
0.52 
(0.87) 
0.56 
(0.90) 
0.57 
(1.02) 
0.77 (1.08) 0.1 
[0.07] 
0.06 
[0.42] 
−0.2 
[0.06] 
Purchase price 
per sq. ft. 
(thousands) 
0.18 (0.29) 0.23 
(0.38) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.15 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
0.26 (0.30) 0.1 
[0.00] 
0.08 
[0.00] 
0.02 
[0.43] 
Head of 
household age 
42.26 
(13.55) 
42.12 
(12.64) 
42.41 
(14.36) 
41.52 
(14.70) 
42.28 
(12.44) 
39.31 
(13.44) 
−0.29 
[0.61] 
0.60 
[0.36] 
2.97 
[0.01] 
Non-White 
head of 
household 
0.18 (0.39) 0.20 
(0.40) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.21 (0.41) 0.03 
[0.09] 
0.02 
[0.32] 
0.00 
[0.91] 
Annual 
household 
income 
(thousands) 
97.77 
(96.07) 
103.90 
(101) 
92.03 
(90.11) 
93.11 
(84.17) 
113.36 
(109) 
112.38 
(91.84) 
11.87 
[0.00] 
10.79 
[0.02] 
0.98 
[0.92] 
Home in 
central city 
0.49 (.50) 0.57 
(0.49) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.20 (0.40) 0.15 
[0.00] 
0.25 
[0.00] 
0.33 
[0.00] 
Mortgage 
interest rate 
5.73 (1.87) 5.66 
(1.90) 
5.81 
(1.84) 
5.70 
(1.85) 
5.59 
(2.08) 
5.61 (2.10) −0.15 
[0.08] 
−0.04 
[0.75] 
−0.02 
[0.92] 
Standard deviations shown in parenthesis (); p-values shown in brackets []. 
Summary statistics are for owner-occupied homes only. 
Source: Author calculations using data from 2007 American Housing Survey, 
National Sample.  
Regression discontinuity equations use census tract-level data 
for Maryland and Pennsylvania from the 2000 Census. The census 
does not have as detailed information on dwellings as the AHS, but 
does offer some measure of the size of homes and if they are owner 
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occupied. As a proxy for the size of home, I use the number of rooms 
in owner occupied dwellings, reported as the median for each census 
tract. To estimate the effect of the MID on home ownership I use the 
percentage of owner occupied homes in the census-tract. 
I measure the distance to the MDL border for each census tract 
in Maryland and Pennsylvania as straight-line distance using ArcGIS 
software. To do this, I measure the distance to the border from the 
geographic center of the census tract. For the regression discontinuity 
equations, I have 7,513 total census tract observations, 3,147 in 
Pennsylvania and 1,219 in Maryland. 565 of the census tract 
observations are within 50 miles of the state border in Pennsylvania, 
and 619 are within 50 miles of the state border in Maryland. The 
number of census tracts shrinks considerably using bandwidths less 
than 50, there are only 325 tracts within 25 miles of the border, and 
only 113 within 10 miles of the border. 
6. Results 
6.1. State policy results 
Table 3 presents the results for estimating Eq. (2) using the 
AHS dwelling level data. The first four columns of Table 3 show the 
results from a variety of specifications estimating the effect of a state 
MID on the size of home (measured in square feet), these regressions 
include only data on owner-occupied units as the MID is only available 
to home-owners. The last four columns of Table 3 show results from 
regressions estimating the effect of the MID on the probability the 
occupant is an owner and use both renter and owner occupied units. 
Table 3. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: state policy 
estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis). 
 
Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MID 
available 
214.8** 
(102.1) 
207.3** 
(98.46) 
277.0* 
(136.6) 
288.0** 
(135.9) 
−0.0326 
(0.0340) 
−0.0498 
(0.0312) 
−0.00748 
(0.0213) 
−0.0182 
(0.0193) 
Top MTR 
−16.93 
(16.60) 
−15.10 
(16.09) 
−21.14 
(19.91) 
−21.98 
(20.18) 
−0.00360 
(0.00574) 
−0.00100 
(0.00472) 
−0.00133 
(0.00330) 
−0.000121 
(0.00283) 
Age of 
housing unit 
(years) 
  
−33.15*** 
(7.826) 
−33.59*** 
(7.665) 
  
−0.00664*** 
(0.00112) 
−0.00625*** 
(0.00106) 
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Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age of 
housing unit 
squared 
(years) 
  
0.269*** 
(0.0767) 
0.274*** 
(0.0753) 
  
3.87e−05*** 
(1.03e−05) 
3.64e−05*** 
(9.84e−06) 
Single family 
home 
  
733.2*** 
(115.1) 
736.1*** 
(116.0) 
  
0.487*** 
(0.0207) 
0.463*** 
(0.0218) 
Annual 
maintenance 
costs per sq. 
ft. 
  
−118.4*** 
(41.83) 
−121.3*** 
(41.11) 
    
Purchase 
price per sq. 
ft. 
(thousands) 
  
−619.9** 
(250.0) 
−646.3** 
(255.3) 
    
Head of 
household 
age 
  
48.33* 
(23.80) 
53.00** 
(22.63) 
  
0.00875*** 
(0.00242) 
0.00529** 
(0.00230) 
Age squared   
−0.404 
(0.280) 
−0.452* 
(0.264) 
  
−6.74e−05*** 
(2.37e−05) 
−4.17e−05* 
(2.27e−05) 
Non-white 
head of 
household 
  
−153.2* 
(85.54) 
−146.6* 
(85.36) 
  
−0.0678*** 
(0.0150) 
−0.0648*** 
(0.0139) 
Annual 
household 
income 
(thousands) 
  
4.231*** 
(0.592) 
4.221*** 
(0.588) 
  
0.00128*** 
(0.000105) 
0.00122*** 
(9.64e−05) 
Home in 
central city 
  
−196.5*** 
(64.31) 
−199.2*** 
(63.45) 
  
−0.0353** 
(0.0145) 
−0.0346** 
(0.0142) 
Mortgage 
interest rate 
  
−2.901 
(20.71) 
−10.49 
(22.10) 
    
Region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of 
move 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2315 2315 1480 1480 6531 6531 6363 6363 
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.199 0.202 0.003 0.092 0.393 0.419 
Notes: Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey 
National Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. 
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the 
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003. 
Size of home is measured in square feet and these results include only owner 
occupied properties. 
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance 
costs as these are only available for owners. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1.  
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The results presented in Table 3 show a strong positive 
relationship between the presence of a state MID and the square 
footage of owner occupied homes. The point estimates suggest the 
presence of a state MID increases the average size of owner-occupied 
homes by between 207 and 288 square feet, or between 10.9% and 
15.2% at the sample mean. These results are statistically significant at 
either 5% or 10% level depending on the specification. All regressions 
in Table 3 control for the census region of the home and cluster 
standard errors at the state level. 
Results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 control for a variety of 
household characteristics that also effect the size of home purchased. 
Comparing these results with columns (1) and (2), the point estimates 
are somewhat larger when using control variables, but still within one 
standard error. All control variables have the expected sign- older 
homes are smaller, single family homes are larger, homes with higher 
maintenance per square foot are smaller, homes with higher price per 
square foot are smaller, older heads of households with more income 
purchase larger homes, homes in central cities are smaller, and homes 
with a higher mortgage interest rate are smaller. 
Table 3 shows the relationship between the presence of a state 
MID and the probability a unit is owner-occupied is quite weak. In fact, 
point estimates suggest the MID actually decreases the probability a 
unit is owner-occupied by as much as 4.9% points. None of the results 
estimating the effect of the MID on the probability of homeownership 
is statistically different than zero, evidence that the MID does not work 
on the extensive margin in the housing market.16 Combined with the 
results in columns (1)–(4) these results suggest the MID does not 
encourage home ownership, but instead encourages the purchase of a 
larger home. 
The MID may have a differential effect for houses that are 
purchased close to the construction date, as those homes most 
accurately capture the optimal housing choice given current market 
conditions.17 While this is certainly true, the limited number of 
observations (between 140 and 215 homes depending on control 
variables) that I am able to match MID availability, year of 
construction, and a move in date after 2003 make this estimation less 
reliable. I run regressions for the sub-sample of homes that match my 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
19 
 
other data requirements and find the MID coefficient is positive for 
homes purchased within 5 years of construction. The magnitude of this 
coefficient varies considerably across estimation techniques, however, 
and suggests the MID is responsible for an increase in home size 
between 84 and 407 square feet. The MID coefficient is not statistically 
different than zero for any specification using home purchased within 
5 years of construction, likely due to the small sample size. 
6.2. Regression discontinuity results 
For the regression discontinuity design, estimating (3) and (4) I 
use census-tract level data for Maryland and Pennsylvania from the 
2000 Census. The top panel of Table 4 shows regression discontinuity 
results using the median number of rooms in owner occupied homes 
as the dependent variable (a proxy for home size, as square footage is 
not available). The bottom panel of Table 4 shows results for a 
regression discontinuity using the percent of owner-occupied homes as 
the dependent variable. Both panels include estimation controlling for 
distance to the MDL, as well as estimates that do not control for 
distance. 
Table 4. The effect of the MID on home size and ownership: regression 
discontinuity estimates (p-value in brackets). 
 
Bandwidth around limit (h) 
 
Full sample 150 miles 100 miles 50 miles 25 miles 10 miles 
Size of home 
N in PA, N in MD 3147, 1219 2753, 1200 2345, 1109 565, 619 178, 147 53, 60 
αMD − αPA 0.24 0.11 0.01 0.32 −0.06 0.02 
%Increase from MID 3.65 1.60 0.00 5.00 −0.01 0.01 
Ho: αMD − αPA = 0 [0.00] [0.14] [0.94] [0.01] [0.72] [0.91] 
αMD − αPA (excluding distance) 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.11 0.04 0.02 
%Increase from MID 5.43 5.45 5.24 1.73 0.66 0.01 
Ho: αMD − αPA = 0 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.25] [0.43] [0.82] 
 
Percent owner occupied 
N in PA, N in MD 3131, 1213 2737, 1195 2329, 1104 564, 615 178, 146 53, 60 
αMD − αPA −0.03 −0.02 −0.04 0.04 −0.13 0.06 
%Increase from MID −4.49 −3.88 −5.74 5.75 −15.63 8.08 
Ho: αMD − αPA = 0 [0.02] [0.07] [0.02] [0.07] [0.00] [0.30] 
αMD − αPA (excluding distance) −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.08 −0.07 
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Bandwidth around limit (h) 
 
Full sample 150 miles 100 miles 50 miles 25 miles 10 miles 
% Increase from MID −3.55 −3.37 −3.26 1.58 −10.40 −8.98 
Ho: αMD − αPA = 0 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.56] [0.00] [0.02] 
Notes: Results in the top panel are reported from regressions that use the 
median number of rooms per owner-occupied home in the census tract as the 
dependant variable. 
Results in the bottom panel are reported from regressions that use the percent 
of owner occupied homes in the census tract as the dependant variable. 
Source: Author’s calculations using 2000 Census data.  
The results in the top panel of Table 4 show a fairly robust 
relationship between the presence of the MID and the size of home 
purchased by owner–occupants. Using the full sample of census tracts 
in each state and controlling for distance to the MDL, the discontinuity 
in the median number of rooms is .24 at the state border – a 
difference of 3.65% of the sample mean. This says that the MID is 
responsible for a 3.65% increase in the median number of rooms in 
owner occupied homes. Fig. 3 demonstrates the estimated regression 
discontinuity results graphically as a jump in the median size of homes 
occurs at the border. 
 
Fig. 3. Regression discontinuity results for effect of MID on median number of 
rooms.  
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The size and significance of this relationship are strained when 
adjusting the bandwidth around border, the relationship becomes 
insignificant for samples within 150 and 100 miles of the border when 
controlling for distance. Using only census tracts within 50 miles of the 
border, the measured discontinuity is strong and shows a statistically 
significant increase in home size of .32 rooms when the MID is 
available. The .32 room increase from the MID equals a 5% increase in 
home size at the sample mean. Tightening the bandwidth to 25 or 10 
miles yields statistically insignificant results with extremely small 
magnitudes. 
The regression discontinuity results that exclude distance 
controls all show a positive relationship between the MID and home 
size. These results suggest a slightly larger magnitude, and remain 
stronger at smaller bandwidths than the results that control for 
distance. Using the full sample, the regression discontinuity results 
suggest about a 5.4% increase in the median number of rooms, a 
result than remains consistent when narrowing the bandwidth to 150 
or 100 miles while retaining statistical significance. As with the results 
that control for distance, specifications with smaller and smaller 
bandwidths lose statistical significance. 
The regression discontinuity results in the bottom panel of Table 
4 show the MID actually reduces the percent of owner–occupants in 
four out of six specifications. These results are more evidence that the 
MID does not encourage home-ownership on the margin. The 
exceptions to the negative estimates are the results using census 
tracts within 50 and 10 miles of the state border, which show a 
substantial increase in the percent of owner–occupants, only the 50 
mile results is marginally statistically significant, but suggests that the 
MID increases the probability of home-ownership by about 5.75% at 
the mean. 
The regression discontinuity results for homeownership that 
exclude distance controls are similar to the results controlling for 
distance. These results suggest a negative relationship between the 
MID and homeownership that is similar in size to the results controlling 
for distance in most specifications, with the primary exception being 
the results within 10 miles of the MDL. Results that do not control for 
distance suggest a sizable negative relationship between the MID and 
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ownership rates that is statistically significant, whereas the results that 
control for distance suggest a statistically imprecise positive 
relationship. 
6.3. Alternative comparison group results 
The results using state level policy to identify the effect of the 
MID on size of home and home ownership decisions rely on three 
primary assumptions. First, homes in states without an MID make a 
valid counter-factual for what homes in states with an MID would look 
like in the absence of the policy. Second, there are no omitted 
variables influencing size and ownership decisions correlated with 
availability of the MID. Third, the policy is not endogenous- individuals 
with larger homes do not cause states to have an MID. 
The summary statistics and corresponding t-tests in Table 2 
address the first point to some degree. Column (7) of Table 2 shows 
how the group of states with and without the MID differ statistically 
along several observed dimensions. Homes in states with a MID are 
more likely to be located in a central city, have household heads with 
higher incomes, and have a higher price per square foot than homes in 
states without an MID. They are also marginally more likely to have 
household heads that are non-white, higher annual maintenance costs, 
and lower mortgage rates. 
The regression results presented in Table 3 control for all 
observable factors, however, the observed differences shown in Table 
2 suggest that there may be other important differences between 
these states that cannot be observed. This possibility suggests homes 
in states without an MID do not make an ideal group for creating a 
counter-factual. I use two alternative comparison groups to create a 
counter-factual for what home size and ownership would look like in 
the absence of a state MID. First, I compare states without an MID, 
but that have an income tax, to states with an MID (and income tax). 
Second, I use only states with a top marginal income tax rate more 
than the median in the sample (7.7%), and compare those with and 
without a state MID. 
Column (8) of Table 2 shows how states with an MID compare 
to states without an MID, but with an income tax. Notice that the 
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difference in maintenance costs, interest rates, and non-white head of 
household are no longer apparent, although differences in purchase 
price, income, and central city location remain. Column (9) of Table 2 
shows how states with or without MID, but with a top marginal income 
tax rate more than the median in the data compare. Using this 
comparison group eliminates observed differences income, but 
differences in age of the home and householder become stronger. 
Table 5 shows estimation results for Eq. (2) using the 
alternative comparison groups to estimate the effect of the MID on 
home size and homeownership. The results are quite similar to the 
primary results shown in Table 3 – the MID is responsible for 
increasing the size of home purchased, but not for increasing the 
probability a home is owner-occupied. 
Table 5. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: alternative 
control group estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in 
parenthesis). 
 
Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
Income tax states 
 
States with MTR 
over median 
 
Income tax states 
 
States with MTR over 
median 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MID 
available 
307.7** 322.9** 251.8** 320.9* −0.0156 −0.0226 −0.0640 −0.0298* 
 (143.0) (140.6) (98.65) (145.1) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0658) (0.0151) 
Top MTR −13.77 −14.18 23.12 8.334 −0.00208 −0.000142 −0.0371 −0.00401 
 (24.60) (24.67) (33.81) (60.19) (0.00518) (0.00427) (0.0418) (0.00660) 
Age of 
housing unit 
(years) 
−37.14*** −37.43*** −31.34*** −30.53** −0.00700*** −0.00661*** −0.00867*** −0.00831*** 
 (8.058) (7.947) (9.081) (9.309) (0.00135) (0.00126) (0.000542) (0.000672) 
Age of 
housing unit 
squared 
(years) 
0.308*** 0.312*** 0.240∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 4.16e−05*** 3.91e−05*** 6.11e−05*** 5.74e−05*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0752) (0.0865) (0.0897) (1.22e−05) (1.14e−05) (6.33e−06) (7.02e−06) 
Single family 
home 
754.9*** 755.6*** 601.6*** 606.8*** 0.489*** 0.468*** 0.462*** 0.444*** 
 (139.0) (137.5) (123.4) (127.8) (0.0231) (0.0244) (0.0479) (0.0462) 
Annual 
maintenance 
costs 
−107.5** −110.9** −73.08*** −73.69***     
 (40.52) (40.30) (7.630) (7.866)     
Purchase 
price per sq. 
−582.5** −604.9** −1,098*** −1,131***     
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Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
Income tax states 
 
States with MTR 
over median 
 
Income tax states 
 
States with MTR over 
median 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ft. 
(thousands) 
 (234.9) (241.1) (169.4) (172.8)     
Head of 
household 
age 
36.82 41.61 26.77 35.09 0.00862*** 0.00550* 0.0104** 0.00688 
 (30.13) (28.37) (29.73) (30.63) (0.00310) (0.00292) (0.00443) (0.00448) 
Age squared −0.273 −0.322 −0.0732 −0.154 −6.80e−05** −4.58e−05 −8.80e−05* −6.15e−05 
 (0.354) (0.332) (0.351) (0.357) (2.97e−05) (2.80e−05) (4.05e−05) (4.16e−05) 
Non-white 
head of 
household 
−140.3 −134.9 −59.00 −42.73 −0.0587*** −0.0548*** −0.0273 −0.0225 
 (106.5) (105.5) (108.2) (107.0) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0174) 
Annual 
household 
income 
(thousands) 
4.145*** 4.124*** 2.902*** 2.879*** 0.00130*** 0.00124*** 0.00137*** 0.00128*** 
 (0.719) (0.716) (0.575) (0.549) (0.000110) (9.93e−05) (0.000106) (7.76e−05) 
Home in 
central city 
−242.3*** −241.7*** −208.7*** −215.2*** −0.0226** −0.0236** −0.00161 −0.00660 
 (75.78) (74.25) (57.15) (55.22) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0165) 
Mortgage 
interest rate 
9.739 3.000 12.38 8.932     
 (18.64) (21.31) (23.87) (27.31)     
Region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of 
move 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1173 1173 497 497 4952 4952 2041 2041 
R-squared 0.205 0.208 0.242 0.249 0.398 0.423 0.388 0.414 
Notes: The income tax states control group includes all states that have a tax 
on wage income. 
The states with MTR over median control group includes all states that have a 
top marginal income tax rate over 7.7, the median for states that tax wage. 
Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey National 
Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. 
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the 
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003. 
Size of home is measured in square feet and includes only owner occupied 
properties. 
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance 
costs as these are only available for owners. 
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
25 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show results using only homes 
in states with an income tax as the comparison group for homes in 
states with an income tax and MID. The point estimates suggest the 
MID is responsible for between a 307 and 322 square foot increase in 
the size of home purchased, larger than the estimates using all homes 
as the comparison group. These estimates are equal to between a 
16.3% and 17.1% change in the size of home at the mean. The 
standard errors on the estimates using only income tax states as a 
comparison group are larger than the full sample estimates, but still 
small enough to be able to make the estimates statistically significant 
at the 5% level. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show results using only homes 
in states with a top marginal income tax rate above the sample 
median (7.7%) to estimate the effect of the MID. The point estimates 
suggest the MID is responsible for increasing the size of homes 
purchased by between 251 and 320 square feet, or between 13.3% 
and 17% at the mean. The standard errors on these estimates are 
quite small, making the estimates statistically significant at either 5% 
or 10% level. The larger point estimates than the primary results using 
only state policy variation, suggest that these regressions remove the 
direct effects of higher income taxes on consuming more housing, so 
they may be a more pure measure of the MID-only effect. 
Columns (5–8) of Table 5 show that despite changing the 
comparison group the MID continues to have almost no statistically 
discernable effect on the probability a home is owner-occupied. The 
estimated effect of the MID on homeownership is only marginally 
statistically significant (at the 10% level) in one specification, and in 
all cases suggests a negative effect on the probability that a home is 
owner occupied. The sign and lack of statistical significance for the 
effect of the MID on home ownership using the alternative comparison 
groups matches the estimates using the full sample of homes. 
6.4. Instrumental variables results 
The strong link between the MID and size of home and non-
existent link between the MID and home ownership is robust to using 
different comparison groups to create a counterfactual for what 
housing would look like in the absence of the policy. Two remaining 
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concerns – omitted variables bias, and policy endogeneity – can both 
be addressed using instrumental variables estimation.18 One could 
make the argument that residents who have a strong preference for 
consuming housing are more likely to lobby state governments to 
allow a state level MID. If this is the case, then it is large homes 
causing the state MID – a classic policy endogeneity. 
An instrument in this case requires a variable correlated with a 
state allowing a deduction for mortgage interest, but only correlated 
with home size through its correlation with state MID policy. An 
instrument that plausibly meets these criteria is whether the state 
uses the federal definition of itemized deductions, thus passively 
allowing the MID.19 Using the federal definition of itemized deductions 
is arguably uncorrelated with many of the potential sources of omitted 
variable bias and reverse causality between the MID and home size 
because it implies that the residents of the state did not actively lobby 
to get a MID. States that take the federal definition of itemized 
deductions allow all federal deductions, not just the MID, so it is 
unlikely that having this policy is strongly correlated with resident 
preferences for housing consumption. States still actively choose to 
allow the federal definition of itemized deductions but this would most 
likely be the result of influence from a number of beneficiaries of such 
a decision as there are a variety of itemized deductions including for 
medical and dental expenses, state and local taxes, gifts to charity, 
and business expenses incurred. 
The second criterion for an instrument, being correlated with 
having a state MID, is an empirical question to be answered by the 
first stage regression results. As shown in Table 6, using the federal 
definition of itemized deductions is strongly correlated with having a 
state MID. This correlation exists when controlling for other variables, 
regional dummy variables, year-of-move dummy variables, and 
clustering standard errors at the state level. For all specifications, the 
instrument F-statistic is above 150, far greater than the typical 
accepted value of 10, and in all cases the p-value for this statistic 
shows it is significant at less than the 1% level.20 
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Table 6. First Stage IV results: instrument for MID with states that use federal 
definition of itemized deductions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Federal definition of itemized 
deductions 
0.8922*** 0.8916*** 0.8718*** 0.8711*** 
 (0.0674) (0.0675) (0 .0110) (0.0714) 
Instrument F-test 175.37 174.45 150.47 148.9 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Includes other control variables No No Yes Yes 
Census region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of move-in dummies No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2251 2251 1434 1434 
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01. 
Table 7 presents the 2nd stage instrumental variables results 
estimating the effect of the MID on home size and ownership using 
states that take the federal definition of itemized deductions as an 
instrument for the MID. Columns (1) through (4) show the results 
using instrumental variables are quite similar to the primary results 
and the results using alternative comparison groups. The instrumental 
variables results suggest the MID is responsible for home size 
increasing by between 221 and 348 square feet, or between 11.7% 
and 18.4% at the sample mean. The IV results using all control 
variables are significant at the 5% level; however, the results using no 
control variables are only significant at the 10% level. The results 
estimating the effect of the MID on homeownership again show no 
statistically significant relationship, with negative point estimates as in 
the primary results. 
Table 7. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: 
instrumental variables estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis). 
 
Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MID 
available 
232.3* 221.9* 335.8** 348.6** −0.0394 −0.0584 −0.0170 −0.0277 
(119.4
) 
(118.0
) 
(152.9) (151.2) (0.0381) (0.0346) (0.0248) (0.0224) 
Top MTR 
−21.6
4 
−19.6
6 
−26.96 −27.58 
−0.0032
3 
−0.00050
6 
−0.000774 0.000374 
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Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(19.00
) 
(18.69
) 
(22.50) (22.67) 
(0.00608
) 
(0.00503) (0.00339) (0.00286) 
Age of 
housing unit 
(years) 
  
−34.31**
* 
−34.74**
* 
  −0.00703*** 
−0.00661**
* 
  (7.971) (7.817)   (0.00114) (0.00109) 
Age of 
housing unit 
squared 
(years) 
  0.283*** 0.288***   4.21e−05*** 
3.95e−05**
* 
  (0.0781) (0.0767)   (1.07e−05) (1.02e−05) 
Single 
family home 
  726.3*** 729.3***   0.482*** 0.458*** 
  (118.1) (119.4)   (0.0207) (0.0218) 
Annual 
maintenanc
e costs 
  
−120.2**
* 
−123.3**
* 
    
  (42.83) (42.04)     
Purchase 
price per sq. 
ft. 
(thousands) 
  −614.5** −644.0**     
  (244.9) (250.7)     
Head of 
household 
age 
  46.26* 50.97**   0.00902*** 0.00555** 
  (24.85) (23.60)   (0.00246) (0.00235) 
Age squared 
  −0.382 −0.432   
−7.02e−05**
* 
−4.41e−05
* 
  (0.292) (0.276)   (2.42e−05) (2.33e−05) 
Non-white 
head of 
household 
  −143.7 −135.4   −0.0651*** −0.0625*** 
  (87.83) (87.27)   (0.0148) (0.0139) 
Annual 
household 
income 
(thousands) 
  4.272*** 4.258***   0.00127*** 0.00121*** 
  (0.608) (0.605)   (0.000105) (9.62e−05) 
Home in 
central city 
  
−213.9**
* 
−215.9**
* 
  −0.0389** −0.0381** 
  (66.47) (65.21)   (0.0145) (0.0142) 
Mortgage 
interest rate 
  −0.743 −10.16     
  (21.82) (23.58)     
Region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of 
move 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observation
s 
2251 2251 1434 1434 6353 6353 6190 6190 
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.199 0.202 0.003 0.093 0.392 0.418 
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Notes: Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey 
National Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. 
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the 
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003. 
Size of home is measured in square feet and includes only owner occupied 
properties. 
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance 
costs as these are only available for owners. 
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
6.5. Accounting for sample selection 
One remaining concern with the primary estimates using the 
AHS sample is that I can only identify MID status for homes that are 
located in an SMSA with a population greater than 100,000, thus any 
homes in more rural areas and small SMSAs are excluded from the 
estimation. I start with the sample of 16,785 homes where the 
occupant moved in during the 2003–2007 period to match the MID 
availability data. From this sample, 7,398 include SMSA information. 
Of the 7,398 potential usable homes in the sample about another 800–
1000 are missing data on at least one explanatory variable, size, or 
ownership status and do not appear in all regressions. A potential 
problem highlighted by the select sample is that it is made up of only 
about 35% home owners.21 This section explores using sample 
selection techniques to deal with any bias that using a smaller sample 
of homeowners that reside in relatively larger SMSAs may cause in the 
primary estimates. 
The vast majority of sample selection comes from excluding 
information on the SMSA, which can be considered as a classic 
problem of sample selection based on an exogenous explanatory 
variable, detailed in Wooldridge (2002) and first explained by 
Heckman (1979). To account of this type of selection, I first estimate 
the selection equation to explain SMSA status. The selection equation 
is a probit of the following form: 
γ = eα + β1(Floors) + Χβ + Ζ 
(5) 
where Y is equal to one when SMSA information is known, and zero 
otherwise, X represents all control variables from the home size 
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equations including: unit age (squared), single family status, 
household head age (squared), non-white household head, household 
income, and central city status. In addition, the exogenous variable 
“Floors” is the height of the building the housing unit resides in 
measured by the number of floors. Floors is used as an exogenous 
variable to explain SMSA status, and is excluded from primary 
estimation. Although using building height is not randomly assigned, it 
meets the condition of being correlated with SMSA status, and is 
arguably orthogonal to anything unobservable in the ownership or size 
regressions. I use the coefficients from Eq. (5) to create predicted 
probabilities that a home is in the sample, also known as the inverse 
Mills ratio. These predicted probabilities, λ, are then used in the 
primary estimating equation to control for sample selection. The 
estimating equation with the selection correction becomes: 
𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(MID)𝑖 + 𝛽2(Top MTR)𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝜆) + Ζ𝑖
ˊ𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 
(6) 
Table 8 shows the results of estimating Eq. (6), both with OLS 
and also treating MID as endogenous and using IV. These results again 
confirm what the previous estimation techniques showed – the MID is 
associated with larger homes in a statistically meaningful way, but is 
not related to homeownership rates. The magnitude of the selection 
corrected estimates is in the middle of the OLS and IV estimates, and 
suggests the MID is responsible for increasing home size by between 
273 and 314 square feet, or between 14.5% and 16.6% at the sample 
mean. 
Table 8. The effect of the MID on home size and home ownership: sample 
selection corrected estimates (standard errors clustered at the state level in 
parenthesis). 
 
Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MID Available 273.1** 299.8** 280.5** 314.7* −0.00621 −0.0176 −0.0197 −0.0278 
 (110.9) (139.6) (124.5) (156.0) (0.0227) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0221) 
Top MTR −19.65 −24.29 −23.80 −22.97 −0.00462 −0.000164 −0.00358 0.000386 
 (17.44) (20.82) (19.84) (23.16) (0.00410) (0.00281) (0.00429) (0.00284) 
Sample 
selection 
parameter 
−804.4** 8,610*** −792.9** 4,970*** −0.496*** 0.377 −0.505*** 0.0144 
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Home size 
 
Home ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 (303.0) (2,545) (313.3) (1,550) (0.0510) (0.363) (0.0476) (0.0826) 
Age of 
housing unit 
(years) 
 −182.5***  −120.6***  −0.0127**  −0.00685*** 
  (45.64)  (23.94)  (0.00579)  (0.00197) 
Age of 
housing unit 
squared 
(years) 
 1.627***  1.069***  9.50e−05*  4.17e−05** 
  (0.409)  (0.210)  (5.18e−05)  (1.85e−05) 
Single family 
home 
 1,895***  1,441***  0.512***  0.460*** 
  (345.6)  (158.9)  (0.0541)  (0.0236) 
Annual 
maintenance 
costs per sq. 
ft. 
 −119.0***  −117.6**     
  (42.19)  (43.91)     
Purchase 
price per sq. 
ft. 
(thousands) 
 −654.4**  −709.1**     
  (252.7)  (259.1)     
Head of 
household 
age 
 19.20  30.74  0.00407**  0.00550** 
  (20.66)  (25.07)  (0.00198)  (0.00240) 
Age squared  −0.0440  −0.184  −2.64e−05  −4.36e−05∗ 
  (0.249)  (0.303)  (1.89e−05)  (2.38e−05) 
Non-white 
head of 
household 
 −593.9***  −387.5***  −0.0844***  −0.0632*** 
  (174.8)  (126.6)  (0.0191)  (0.0140) 
Annual 
household 
income 
(thousands) 
 −1.988  0.780  0.000953***  0.00120*** 
  (1.737)  (1.252)  (0.000323)  (9.93e−05) 
Home in 
central city 
 −3.554***  −2.130***  −0.182  −0.0437 
  (998.8)  (593.0)  (0.140)  (0.0371) 
Mortgage 
interest rate 
 −10.66  −3.977     
  (21.69)  (21.71)     
Region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of move 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2284 1480 2223 1434 6363 6363 6190 6190 
R-squared 0.017 0.213 0.016 0.214 0.143 0.419 0.146 0.418 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol 21, No. 3 (2012): pg. 195-210. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
32 
 
Results are from estimates using the 2007 American Housing Survey National 
Sample for households moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. 
The omitted region in all regressions controlling for regions is Northeast, the 
omitted year in all regressions controlling for year of move is 2003. 
Size of home is measured in square feet and these results include only owner 
occupied properties. 
Ownership estimates cannot control for price, interest rate, or maintenance 
costs as these are only available for owners. 
The sample selection variable is the predicted probability that a home is in an 
SMSA using the age, single family status, head of household, race of 
household head, income, and central city status as explanatory variables, 
estimated using the full AHS sample. This equation uses building height of the 
residence measured in floors as the exogenous variation in selection. Columns 
(3), (4), (7), and (8) treat MID as endogenous and estimate with instrumental 
variables, while (1), (2), (5), and (6) estimate with OLS. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper uses differences in state level policy to estimate the 
effect of mortgage interest deductibility on homeownership and size of 
home purchased. Empirical estimates suggest the MID is responsible 
for a 10.9–18.4% increase in the size of home purchased, but that it is 
not correlated with home ownership. The size of these point estimates 
depend on the comparison group and estimation technique. 
The size of the estimates suggests that a state level MID 
induces about an additional 300 square feet of housing purchase, or 
about an average size room for owner occupied homes in the American 
Housing Survey. Applying the user cost model of housing to a state 
with the median top marginal income tax rate, the MID reduces annual 
user cost of homeownership by about 11%.22 The user cost figure 
implies an elasticity of housing purchase on the intensive margin of 
between −1 and −1.4 using the OLS point estimates, so that an 
increase in user cost by 1% reduces housing purchase on the intensive 
margin by between 1% and 1.4%. 
Although the results presented here generally suggest no 
meaningful relationship between the MID and homeownership, the OLS 
and IV point estimates are negative, and the RD point estimates are 
negative and in many cases statistically meaningful. One possible 
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explanation for a negative relationship between the MID and 
homeownership rates is that the MID drives up home prices for 
everyone, while a much smaller number actually claim the deduction 
and receive the subsidy (only about one third of tax filers claim the 
MID). Susin (2002) proposes a similar story for the Section 8 housing 
voucher subsidy, finding that subsidized renters driving up prices hurt 
renters who do not receive the subsidy. 
These findings offer empirical evidence that the tax treatment of 
owner-occupied housing increases the amount of housing consumption 
along a similar magnitude as the parameterized theoretical models of 
Mills, 1987 and Poterba, 1992. The empirical evidence presented here 
suggests the MID causes increased consumption of housing on the 
intensive (larger home) rather than extensive (more home owners) 
margin. 
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Appendix A. Sample size by SMSA used in regressions 
SMSA Ownership regressions Home size regressions 
Akron, OHu 23 7 
Albany, NY 25 8 
Albuquerque, NM 35 11 
Allentown, PA 28 6 
Alton, IL 3 0 
Anaheim, CA 130 42 
Appleton, WI 9 2 
Atlanta, GA 143 39 
Atlantic City, NJ 3 3 
Aurora, IL 17 9 
Austin, TX 64 19 
Bakersfield, CA 30 18 
Baltimore, MD 105 44 
Baton Rouge, LA 22 8 
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SMSA Ownership regressions Home size regressions 
Beaumont, TX 6 4 
Beaver, PA 5 3 
Bergen, NJ 48 19 
Birmingham, AL 36 14 
Boston, MA 133 55 
Boulder, CO 16 4 
Bridgeport, CT 18 9 
Canton, OH 17 7 
Charleston, SC 12 3 
Chicago, IL 305 101 
Cleveland, OH 69 21 
Colorado Springs, CO 24 9 
Columbia, SC 19 6 
Columbus, OH 85 28 
Corpus Christi, TX 19 5 
Dallas, TX 172 46 
Daytona Beach, FL 4 1 
Denver, CO 51 17 
Des Moines, IA 15 7 
Detroit, MI 175 80 
East Saint Louis, IL 5 0 
El Paso, TX 33 17 
Erie, PA 3 0 
Eugene, OR 11 1 
Flint, MI 14 5 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 92 37 
Fort Myers, FL 4 1 
Fort Wayne, IN 12 5 
Fort Worth, TX 89 36 
Fresno, CA 29 8 
Gary, IN 21 7 
Grand Rapids, MI 28 11 
Greensboro, NC 33 10 
Greenville, SC 12 6 
Hartford, CT 11 1 
Honolulu, HI 27 11 
Houston, TX 170 50 
Indianapolis, IN 69 22 
Jackson, MS 11 4 
Jacksonville, FL 55 21 
Jersey City, NJ 36 4 
Knoxville, TN 25 7 
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SMSA Ownership regressions Home size regressions 
Lake County, IL 25 15 
Lakeland, FL 7 4 
Lancaster, PA 7 4 
Lansing, MI 7 2 
Las Vegas, NV 75 31 
Lexington, KY 28 7 
Little Rock, AK 20 10 
Los Angeles, CA 415 108 
Madison, WI 19 6 
McAllen, TX 21 6 
Melbourne, FL 12 4 
Miami, FL 113 39 
Middlesex, NJ 35 17 
Milwaukee, WI 72 27 
Minneapolis, MN 122 47 
Mobile, AL 11 2 
Modesto, CA 13 4 
Monmouth, NJ 24 12 
Montgomery, AL 8 3 
Nashville, TN 53 16 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 74 46 
New Haven, CT 19 9 
New Orleans, LA 46 14 
New York, NY 450 100 
Newark, NJ 83 24 
Oakland, CA 119 49 
Oklahoma City, OK 72 23 
Orlando, FL 61 26 
Oxnard, CA 29 11 
Pensacola, FL 8 2 
Peoria, IL 14 3 
Phoenix, AZ 182 94 
Pittsburgh, PA 77 26 
Providence, RI 26 9 
Raleigh, NC 50 16 
Riverside, CA 88 34 
Rochester, NY 38 14 
Rockford, IL 5 3 
Sacramento, CA 89 28 
Salem, MA 8 4 
Salinas, CA 12 3 
Salt Lake City, UT 70 30 
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SMSA Ownership regressions Home size regressions 
San Antonio, TX 64 14 
San Diego, CA 157 54 
San Francisco, CA 91 26 
San Jose, CA 86 30 
Santa Barbara, CA 14 3 
Santa Rosa, CA 15 5 
Sarasota, FL 6 5 
Scranton, PA 16 5 
Seattle, WA 108 42 
Shreveport, LA 10 7 
Spokane, WA 17 9 
Springfield, MA 29 6 
Stamford, CT 10 4 
Stockton, CA 26 8 
Syracuse, NY 18 2 
Tacoma, WA 34 10 
Tampa, FL 94 39 
Toledo, OH 26 9 
Trenton, NJ 7 4 
Tucson, AZ 44 15 
Tulsa, OK 29 5 
Utica, NY 3 1 
Vallejo, CA 15 9 
Waterbury, CT 6 3 
West Palm Beach, FL 45 22 
Wichita, KS 23 7 
Worcester, MA 8 6 
Youngstown, OH 15 7 
Chicago Areas (Joliet, Lake) 49 38 
New York Areas (Nassau, Suffolk, New 
York) 
23 16 
Northern New Jersey 80 53 
Notes: Sample counts are from 2007 American Housing Survey for households 
moving into homes from 2003 to 2007. Counts for units in ownership regressions 
include all units in the sample where MID is identified by matching the SMSA to a 
state. Counts for units in size regressions include all units in the sample where MID is 
identified by matching the SMSA to a state and the unit is owner occupied. The sample 
excludes the following multi-state SMSAs: Augusta, GA-SC, Chattanooga, TN-GA, 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-IL, Duluth, MN-WI, Johnson 
City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA, Kansas City, KS-MO, Lawrence-Haverhill, MA-NH, 
Memphis, TN-AR, MS, Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA-NC, Omaha, NE-IA, Philadelphia, PA-
NJ, Saint Louis, MO-IL, Washington, DC-MD-VA. 
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proxy (the top marginal tax rate in the state), outlined in 
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original Pennsylvania income tax intended to use federal taxable 
income as a base (and thus allow all federal deductions). The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court over-turned this idea in the 
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rates for taxpayers with equal gross incomes. After the tax was 
passed in March, 1971 but before the Amidon v. Kane decision 
was final in August, 1971 taxpayers may have erroneously 
believed an MID would be available. 
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244 of the Annotated Code of Maryland of 1939–1980), 
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treasury or department of revenue websites. Some states post 
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previous few years. 
15As a robustness check, I do a separate analysis that includes the 
multi-state SMSA’s where the presence of the MID is consistent 
across states in the SMSA. For example, both Iowa and 
Nebraska have a state MID, so Omaha would be included in the 
robustness check and coded to have a MID, but Georgia has an 
MID and Tennessee does not so Chattanooga would be left out 
of the robustness check. For this robustness check, I code the 
state marginal tax rate according to the top rate in the state 
where the majority of SMSA residents live, even though state 
tax rates vary widely. The magnitude of the point estimates 
shown here is somewhat sensitive to including these additional 
SMSAs in the analysis, with the coefficient on the MID variable 
suggesting home size increases by about 15% less than the 
primary results; however in no case can I reject the null 
hypothesis that the point estimates in this sample are equal to 
the primary results. 
16To see if the large standard errors in these estimates are driven by a 
heterogeneous impact of the MID on home ownership across 
groups that are more or less likely to be on the margin between 
owning and renting I estimated (2) separately by age and race 
groups. These estimates show the same negative and 
statistically insignificant relationship as the full sample. 
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17I would like to thank a particularly helpful referee for pointing out 
that because the MID has been in place for a long time without 
changes in most states, it is likely that the size of all homes has 
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